Article

The aim of this study is to examine the long- and short-term economic incentives inherent in the sickness and unemployment insurances. In particular, how the differences, in, for instance,#10; benefit levels between the two systems, affect the duration and outcome of long-term sickness for the unemployed. METHOD: A sample of 280 sick-registered unemployed in the county of Varmland,#10; Sweden was used in two regression models. Sickness duration was modelled in a linear regression and the outcome (healthy and non-healthy) in a logistic regression. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: The#10; study shows that economic incentives, i.e. differences in benefit levels, help in explaining sickness duration. The proven fact, that benefits from the sickness insurance are in general higher than from#10; the unemployment insurance, results in the sickness spells being prolonged. Indications are also found of a preference for long-term income security through the sickness and disability insurances, using#10; the length of unemployment before sickness registration, as a determinant of the outcome of the sickness spell. #10;

Langue : ANGLAIS

Identifiant basis : 2002224416